Next "change"post
I find it's about that time again: another "A mind is a difficult thing to change" post is in the works--at least in my head.
I've found in the past that it's best if I make a public announcement of such. That seems to goad me into actually writing the thing within the next few weeks rather than to procrastinate further, which would otherwise be my wont.
So, stay tuned!
11 Comments:
As the Leslie Nielsen character says in "Airplane!" I want you to know we're all counting on you. :)
It's good to set goals, especially publicly, then you are shamed into not breaking your promise ; )
Exactly, ymarsakar: it's a shame/honor culture here :-).
When I announce a post, I get email pleading for me to abandon the project.
Maybe they're using Reverse Psychology.
- go for it
Inside the Resistance: Leading Arab Journalist Zaki Chehab on the Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East
AMY GOODMAN: What was the beginning of the insurgency? Would you bring it back to the siege of Fallujah?
ZAKI CHEHAB: Not really like this. You know, we have to be fair. I was one of many who felt that invading Iraq is wrong. But when I went to Iraq and I saw how Iraqis have welcomed the overthrow of the regime, I’ve changed my mind. I saw Iraqis in the Kurdish areas dancing after the fall of the regime. Majority of Shiites in the south have welcomed the fall of the regime.
And Sunnis, in general, it’s true that they were like conservative in their feeling, but I visited Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein. And I met the majority of leaders of a tribe. They were -- all of them, they told me in a meeting they had in one of the farms that they were really not happy with Saddam Hussein, and they suffered from his regime like any others in the south and the north. But they couldn't do anything about it. So they gathered six weeks after the fall of Tikrit to tell the world: we hated Saddam Hussein, and we have suffered under his hand as Sunnis, like Shias and Kurds. So, I changed. When I see the majority of Iraqis were happy to see Saddam Hussein, you know, I changed my mind.
What happened later is the kind of mistakes, how we handled the situation. There was no plan how to handle the situation in Iraq. You know, I was surprised a few weeks ago, when I read the memoirs of Paul Bremer, the American ambassador there.
AMY GOODMAN: The memoir of Paul Bremer.
ZAKI CHEHAB: Yeah. It was interesting to see him saying what he said. I was happy a few days ago to hear the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saying for the first time, ‘We have committed thousands of mistakes.’ We should have handled this from day one, because handling the situation in Iraq in a proper way should have saved tens of thousands of Iraqi lives and, I’m sure, thousands of American and other lives.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re talking to Zaki Chehab. He is political editor of London-based Al Hayat newspaper and the Arabic TV channel, LBC. He has written the book, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East. We will come back to continue speaking with him in a minute.
Source: Democracy Now
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
I think if the journalist is really honest and wants what is best for Iraq, he won't mind some American Imperial policies. The lack of Imperial policies were what promoted the "lack of plan" situation after Iraq was liberated.
A lot of people saw the weakness in American policy, and jumped on the insurrection band wagon in order to get a slice of power and money. Happened in New Orleans, sure as heck can happen in barbarian lands.
AMY GOODMAN: And the pressure on -- the U.S. pressure on al-Jaafari to resign as prime minister?
ZAKI CHEHAB: Al-Jaafari, one of his biggest mistake -- or to start, before we talk about al-Jaafari, I suspect that the United States was like prepared to see a pro-Iranian government in power, because the Shia-led coalition, who is in charge, is against American policies in Iraq. They are pro-Iranian, and definitely they will always keep this in mind. Whatever might affect Iranian interests in Iraq, they would be against it. And to see the American-led coalition investing heavily in rebuilding Iraq, the new Iraq, on a basis which like, you know, to be -- to stand on its feet, to find Iraq, and our Interior Minister is pro-Iranian, and to find another security agencies in Iraq built on a broad Iranian support. This is not what the American wants. This is not what majority of Iraqis want. That's why we start feeling the clash.
I heard there are so many efforts being made to convince al-Jaafari to step aside. But so far it failed because Jaafari was elected by the Shia-led alliance as their representative for the new government. And unless the American-led coalition succeeds in convincing other parts of the component of the Shia-led alliance to change Jaafari, then it’s not going to work. And the way things are approached, I think it shouldn't be even-handed. We should not repeat the mistakes which had been committed in the past.
You know, few months ago, just straight ‘til the election in Iraq, we used to hear many voices in Iraq saying we want a timetable for American withdrawal from Iraq. These days, we are not hearing anything like this from the Sunnis, themselves, who used to call for it. Why? Because the Sunnis, they established some kind of dialogue with the American-led coalition in Iraq. So they’re on much better terms. And Sunnis today, they don't mind the Americans staying longer. That's why not a single voice being heard about this, mentioning this the last three months. Some kind of dialogue is already established, and I encourage this. It’s a positive thing they should have done being made a long time ago.
The journalist is apparently honest in his attempts, because he sees the danger of Jaffari and isn't afraid to back iron fist tactics to take Jaffari down, to save Iraq, even if it means helping America.
Creating a balance of powers artificially is tricky. We could threaten to give the Sunnis and the Kurds nuclear launch systems and weapons, and missiles, and nuclear bombs. That will crack the deadlock on Jaffari. The only question is, is Jaffari that much of a danger due to his politics, his anti-Americanism, his pro-Iranian, and pro-Sadr positions that Bush would be willing to play a bit of power politics to get rid of him? Or if he is such a danger, is Bush going to be convinced that diplomacy isn't enough?
omg
Some people know how to quote, but they don't know how to write. Semi-literate indeed.
Post a Comment
<< Home